95001
10725198101090741028.jpg

-Nem alkalmazunk jelzős szerkezetet. Még arra se, akivel nagyon nem értesz egyet.
-Nem gyűlölködünk!
-HADITECHNIKAI TOPIC, aki nem tudja értelmezni, az megy máshova!


[Légi Harcászati / Légvédelmi FAQ]
  • [NST]Cifu
    #80453
    Pár orosz légvédelmi rendszerekről szóló videó (ha voltak már, akkor bocsi)

    Sz-400 videó, 0:41-nél újabb képernyőkép (a cél fölé vitt kurzornál a képernyő közepére kiírja a cél adatait)



    Légvédelmi éleslövészetek (főleg TOR-M1/M2 és mintha Sztrela-10 lenne?)


    Utoljára szerkesztette: [NST]Cifu, 2017.02.01. 19:56:51
  • Hpasp #80452
    OAF légiharc debrief 4/5 (már csak a kakukktojás maradt...)



    SPOILER! Kattints ide a szöveg elolvasásához!
    Lt Col Michael “Dog” Geczy (USAF)
    78th EFS “Bushmasters,” F-16CJ
    Operation ALLIED FORCE
    MiG-29
    4 May 1999
    Call-sign: PUMA 11

    Lt Col Geczy graduated from Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training (ENJJPT) at Sheppard AFB in 1983. Upon completing F-4E training in 1984 he flew the Phantom II for two years, converting to the F-16C in 1986 while on his first operational assignment at Ramstein AB, Germany. He later graduated from the USAF Fighter Weapons School F-16 Division in 1992. Lt Col Geczy had approximately 2,300 flight hours (including previous combat experience in Iraq and Bosnia) in the F-16C (Blocks 15, 30, 42, and 50) before deploying to Aviano AB for Operation ALLIED FORCE (OAF). This MiG-29 kill occurred on his 115th career combat mission, and his seventh mission supporting OAF. The following excerpts were taken from a briefing that Lt Col Geczy gave about a year following the event.

    We were tasked for what we call a "force protection" mission... loaded up with two High Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs), two AIM-120A AMRAAMs, two AIM-9M Sidewinders, a full load of 20mm, and self protection assets (external jamming pod on the centerline, chaff and flares, and towed decoys). As there were no Eagles tasked as part of this daylight strike mission, our job was to protect the strikers from both the surface and air threats.

    The jets were Block 50 F-16CJs. F-16CJs are configured with the HARM Targeting System pod on the side of the intake. The HARMs are those large white missiles closest to the external fuel tanks that home in on radar emissions from SAMs, AAA, or early warning radars. The other key part to our force protection mission was air-to-air, of course. On the wingtip missile stations are the AIM-120 AMRAAMs; we also carried the shorter range AIM-9M infrared missiles on the inboard stations, and the trusty internal, 20 mm Gatling gun for shorter range air-to-air engagements.

    My flight included myself as number one (on my 12th contingency deployment), my wingman, who was a 1 Lt (“DBAL" Austin, with about 350 hours in the jet) on his third contingency deployment; the number three and element lead (“Hajii” Julazadeh) was an instructor pilot with about 1,200 hours (and on his eighth contingency deployment). The number four man, “Nut” Peterson, was absolutely critical to our success that day. Although “Nut” was flying as a wingman and number four, he was then a four-ship flight lead, and upgrading to instructor pilot with about 800 hours in the F-16. Operation ALLIED FORCE was “Nut’s” second contingency deployment. This combat sortie was the seventh or eighth Operation ALLIED FORCE sortie for all of us, since Shaw AFB deployed our squadron into the theater about three weeks into the war as part of a NATO force structure plus-up.

    I have to admit, my opinion is that the Serbian surface-to-air missile (SAM) battery crews were pretty darn good...well trained and coordinated during Operation ALLIED FORCE, and with some pretty creative and unpredictable tactics. They fired over 700 SAMs at NATO aircraft during the war! Of course, the Serbian military had been watching NATO’s operations over Bosnia for more than six years, and had been quick to modify their tactics during this operation to increase the probability of a successful kill against NATO aircraft. So frankly, since the Serbian MiG-29s had not faced NATO pilots for almost seven weeks at this point of the war — and we had just lost our second NATO jet a couple nights prior to a SAM — my biggest concern that day was the SAM operators. I was dead wrong, as the biggest threat that day would end up being one MiG-29 driver who would attempt to intercept “tail-end Charlie" during the egress phase of the strike.

    On that day, NATO was conducting some of its first daylight strikes in central Serbia, near Belgrade. There were two flights of four f-16CJs, each dedicated to the force protection of these midday strikes. My flight, call-sign PUMA 11, was tasked to launch out of Aviano, pre-strike refuel, enter Serbia, protect Strike "Alpha,” egress, refuel again, re-enter Serbia again, and then protect Strike "Charlie.” Strike package “Alpha" that day included Dutch, British, and French strikers. Another flight of four F-16CJs (PANTHER 21) were from Spangdahlem AB (but also launched out of Aviano), and were protecting strikes “Bravo” and "Delta” in the same manner.

    Keep in mind that, since the F-l5Cs were dedicated to protecting the tankers and AWACS that day, they only had CAPs up in Bosnia and Hungary. The other players that day included EA-6Bs, a French AWACS that controlled all of the activity in Bosnia, and a British AWACS that controlled the strikes in Serbia.

    Let's get on to the details of that day. First of all, the weather was poor. The clouds were layered to broken up to almost 30,000 feet. Our flight had some difficulty finding good, clear airspace to CAP to do the best job protecting against the air and surface threats during the strike period. In fact, the British and Dutch strikers ended up weather aborting their attacks completely. On the other hand, the French strikers, or KNIFE 61, were working overtime trying to deliver their bombs between holes in the weather in their target area.

    Near the end of the strike period, KNIFE 61's flight lead requested that we stay on station another eight minutes or so until they finished their attacks. I agreed, but of course, was concerned that we might end up stretching the flight's fuel before we could get back to the tanker. Since my fuel state was actually the lowest in the flight, I made a mental planning note that I was the most “skosh” on gas.

    Later, I heard the next set of F-16CJs for Strike Bravo, PANTHER 21, check in on the strike frequency. Well, the French finished their attacks after about 12 minutes of "overtime," and we started to escort them out of Serbia. Keep in mind, it had been a very quiet mission up to this point. Although we had done some preemptive SAM targeting, we had not fired any HARMs at active sites during this first strike period. I was probably a bit too casual finishing up this "walk in the park" strike package, and too anxious to get air refueled and back on station for the next one.

    It is near the end of this “ho-hum” egress that the AWACS controller calls out that a "bogey" is airborne in Serbia. I completely missed this call! Fortunately, our trusty number four man, "Nut," saved the day, and piped up on our discrete, intra-flight frequency with a "head's up" call and the bogey's position. We immediately turned the four F-16s around, and we faced the bogey in a wall formation. During our turn to face down track, NATO AWACS called out the track as hostile for the first of what would be a total of seven times during the intercept.

    We simultaneously pushed it up to supersonic, climbed up into the high 30s (forgot to jettison our tanks!), and pressed right on into the SAM threat rings. Shortly thereafter, “DBAL" called out that he was bingo fuel...since I knew that I actually had the lowest fuel in the flight, I "copied" his call, and decided that all of us would most likely need to recover into Sarajevo after the engagement.

    About this same time, the AWACS controller made some calls that made the NATO-required beyond-visual-range (BVR) rules of engagement (ROE) matrix damned confusing, and uncertain in my mind. As I was working through this dilemma, both in my head and with some calls back to AWACS, I tried to get PANTHER 21 flight’s radars looking for the target (who were actually trailing us by quite a bit). I frankly started to have my doubts that we were going to finish this intercept with the little fuel remaining. Also during this final period of the intercept, the MiG-29 driver illuminated me with his radar a couple times, which definitely got my attention.

    Fortunately, yet uncomfortably late in the intercept, and at range much less than we all wanted. I finally worked through all the ROE rules with AWACS... I got a chance to put my thumb on the weapons release, or pickle button—one of my last thoughts as I was mashing down on the pickle button was, “if it’s important enough to shoot, shoot two. So, ‘Dog,’ fire these two off as rapidly as possible!"

    Well, it seemed to take FOREVER for that first missile to come off—must have been time compression! I actually had second thoughts about whether I had properly armed-up or not. I just started to glance in the HUD to confirm the arm status, and then I saw the first missile come off from the left wingtip. I mashed the second AMRAAM off as quickly as I could after that first one launched. It didn't seem to take nearly as long for the second AMRAAM to blast off the right wingtip!

    Although I had already fired an AIM-9 in training and HARMs in Bosnia during Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, and earlier in Operation ALLIED FORCE, I had not YET had a firsthand appreciation for what an AMRAAM live-fire looked like. Those two AMRAAM launches were EXTREMELY impressive, and continue to amaze me even today!

    Since the MiG was at short range and maneuvering at this point, the line-of-sight of the target was changing rapidly across my nose and well below me—those missile fins obviously dug-in immediately after launch and dove with rapid, arcing attacks through the HUD field-of-view with breakneck speed (kind of like a pitcher throwing a curve ball)! It was a true testament to American technology that the AMRAAM performed so well at close range, and with a fantastically high line-of-sight! I am not sure any other radar missile out there could have hacked the square-corner that the AMRAAMs made that day!

    Descending quite a bit after the launches, I noted on my radar that the missiles were preparing to impact, and made a mental note that in order to get credit for the kill, “I had better see this, as I may be the only one who witnesses it!” I rolled up in about 90 degrees of left bank, and then saw the aircraft exploding about six thousand feet below, and between scattered cloud layers (basically underneath my left knee). I made two, “Splash one with a fireball!” radio calls to AWACS—guess I knew that my chances of making that call again in my flying career were essentially nil!

    “DBAL,” on the other hand, reported after the mission that he watched both missiles all the way into impact. Fortunately, the weather had scattered out somewhat at the point of intercept, so today "DBAL" has a "nanosecond by nanosecond" recollection of how the aircraft defensively maneuvered to a near perfect beam, the missiles' impacts, how the MiG started to burn, and what parts came off first!

    Following the engagement, as we were all “skosh" on fuel, we immediately started our climb and egress to the west, towards the tanker tracks in Bosnia. I requested that the AWACS controller sector our tanker due east and directly back to us.

    Now the real difficult part of the mission began! As it turned out, and as was frequently true during Operation ALLIED FORCE, the hairiest part of the mission was just beginning: getting rejoined on a tanker that has been directed to retrograde to a safer area, in the weather, while other F-16 and F-15 flights are rejoining on it simultaneously to do their refueling, in the weather. When we crossed into Bosnia, we discovered that our tanker was over 120 miles away and going further away!

    I then set a divert bingo for the flight for Sarajevo, and had to call the tanker crew directly to get them to turn around for an in-the-weather tanker rejoin. In the end, we were able to refuel and get back on station for Strike Charlie. Shortly thereafter Strike Charlie was weather cancelled. With a full load of fuel, we flew back to Aviano “as the crow flies” — supersonic in the low 40s across the whole length of Bosnia, and across the Adriatic Sea — breaking all kinds of rules, I am sure!

    It was raining like cats and dogs when we finally got back to Aviano; of course, I insisted upon bringing the four-ship up a combat, tactical initial after the mission (pretty dumb decision, as the rain storm was almost directly over the air base) — the guys did a marvelous job getting the jets on the deck, despite my stupid act!

    We all lined up in the de-arm area, and a crew chief hooked up on the head-set communications cord during the aircraft de-arming. Since my HARMs were still loaded. I guess he thought that we had a “ho-hum" mission; he asked me in a real low key
    voice, and obviously not really pleased to be in the pouring rain.

    “Well, Sir, how did your mission go?"

    I replied, “Pretty good...Shot a MiG down."

    He yelled back, “You got to be sh!ting me...Sir!”

    I yelled back at him, “Look at the missile rails!!!”

    I looked at the rails too, at that point, and saw the other guys in the de-arm crew doing pull-ups on the missile rails in the rain! They were really psyched up, and came up later after shutdown to give me the AMRAAM umbilical cables that remained—perfect mementos for that mission!

    “Nut” showed exemplary flight discipline that day. First, by succinctly and promptly advising the flight about the AWACS call that a “bogey” was approaching during our egress. And second, by employing his radar as directed to confirm that no other threats were airborne. Also, unlike other “yahoo-cowboy radio calls" that you hear sometimes during MiG kills these days, my flight members did not say ONE word after the MiG-29 was splashed. They maintained the strictest discipline throughout the egress, on to the next AWACS controller in Bosnia, to the tanker, and on the boom taking fuel. Only after the air refueling was complete, and when we were preparing to return for the next strike period, did “Nut” say on the discrete frequency

    “PUMA 1, PUMA 4. request?”

    “Go ahead with your request, PUMA 4”

    “Sir, can we go back there and do that again?”

    By the way, last month "Nut" Peterson was selected to go to F-16 Fighter Weapons School for the class starting this summer.

    There were some internet claims immediately after the war that this MiG-29 was mistakenly shot down by a Serbian SAM battery. That is absolute, complete, and pure BS! You can actually see the aircraft break up on my radar tape after the missile’s impact!

    I cannot speculate upon the Serbian Air Force single ship tactics that day, or why someone would make such a claim, other than to perhaps save face for the Serbian MiG-29s that performed so poorly during the war against NATO pilots (for lots of reasons, I am sure: weak equipment, poor aircraft serviceability, lousy Soviet-style training and flying currency, etc). Lately, more and more of the Serbian internet sites acknowledge that this MiG-29 was downed by an F-16CJ.

    But what I can say is that the four of us that day were employing fully mission capable F-16CJs with 100% of our jets and avionics operational (thanks to our maintenance technicians), fully armed with a variety of operational weapons ready to handle all kinds of threats (thanks to our munitions, armament, and weapons technicians), and were fully trained to handle the events of that day (thanks to the USAF training and readiness model).

    You bet, there are decisions and tactics that I would do differently if I had a chance to do that mission again. But any of my flight members could have ended up firing those two AMRAAMs and getting a MiG-29 kill that day. I was fortunate to have been the leader and targeted the group, and thankfully supported by a great flight of Viper drivers, particularly “Nut” Peterson, who really got the “light bulb turned on” during our egress.

    Although Lt Col Geczy deployed to Operation ALLIED FORCE as part of the 78th Fighter Squadron, the deployment included jets from other squadrons at Shaw AFB. The aircraft during Lt Col Geczy’s MiG-29 engagement (91-0353) was actually from the 77th FS “Gamblers.” Lt Col Geczy went on to command the 77th Fighter Squadron, and made F-16 91-0353 the squadron flagship during his two year command.

  • molnibalage83
    #80451
    Hát itt aztán tényleg van minden... A 6942 fasza.
    Utoljára szerkesztette: molnibalage83, 2017.02.01. 15:46:14
  • molnibalage83
    #80450
    Te el tudod olvasni a feliratokat?
  • [NST]Cifu
    #80449
    Brit Eurofighter tankolás...
  • JanáJ
    #80448
    Égi ruhatár
  • [NST]Cifu
    #80447
    Sajnos én is csak ennyi találtam. A fej inkább emlékeztet az AIM-9L-re, mint az AIM-9D-re, tehát lehet már az all-aspect érzékelőt vették figyelembe. Viszont ne feledjük, hogy ez US NAVY történet volt, nekik meg ott volt az F-14A és az AIM-54 a célra...
  • [NST]Cifu
    #80446
    Nekem nem kerek ez a 25-50km-es fehér vonal. Nézzük (a képek miatt legyen spoilerben):

    SPOILER! Kattints ide a szöveg elolvasásához!

    Eredeti kép, a belső fehér kör nyugatra jól láthatóan Sarvvik mellett metszi a Finn-öbölből bevágó öblöt.

    Játszunk egy kicsit, a felhasznált megoldás: Freemaptools:

    A központ Helsinki, a rádiusz 20km:



    Nagyítsunk rá:



    Kinyagyítva a NASAMS kezelőképernyőről ez a rész:


    Egy kicsit balra van Savvik-tól, de kb. stimmel a pozíció (~1km tévedéssel)


    Most dőljünk hátra, és elemezzük ezt:

    A képernyőképen ha a zöld kör a HMZ, akkor annak a középpontja valamelyik MML kellene, hogy legyen. Viszont a körök középpontja az 'A' betűvel jelölt FDC. Tehát a zöld kör nem lehet a HMZ, vagy legalábbis nem abban az értelemben, ahogy mi gondoljuk.

    Nézzük másképpen. Vegyük azt, hogy a folyamatos vonal a lőtávban lévő célokat jelenti, és számoljunk úgy, hogy a belső fehér kör 20km.

    Ez alapján:



    205 pixel = 20km (fehér kör sugár)
    288 pixel = 28km (2S MML-ből kiinduló folyamatos vonal)
    290 pixel = 28,3km (1S MML-ből kiinduló folyamatos vonal)

    Oké, a 28km még így is sok, ha Molni adatait nézzük, de mégis közelebb van hozzá, mint a 40km-es HMZ érték...
    Utoljára szerkesztette: [NST]Cifu, 2017.02.01. 11:31:28
  • JanáJ
    #80445
    Nincs egy OCR-es scanner a közeledben? Kevésbé fájna. :-)
  • molnibalage83
    #80444
    Nem igazán világos számomra, hogy 1970-ben mi a fenét akartak ezzel. Akkor még nem volt InSb érzékelő, tehát nem volt all aspect AIM-9. A cél mögül kellett volna indítani, azt meg M2.0 felett hasító célra. Mission impossible, més all aspect seekerrel sem mentek volna sokra. Nagyon közel kellett volna kerülni és legfeljebb oldalról lett volna esélye F-15-nek bár kisebb magasságon lehet, hogy már kellő távolságról fogtva volt a 25-ös utánégetőjét a InSb érzékelő. Az AIM-7E kinematikája mai szemmel megmosolyogtató, de még azzal sem volt esélye nagyon a sikerre, akkor ezzel hogyan gondolták?

    Az F-15A/C-nek volt esélye kb. fél légiharc fegyverzettel úgy, ha "megrendezték" a támadást - pl. RF-4, mint csali gép, IAF csinálta ezt - és akkor a feléjük rohanó gépre indítottak. Ha nem vette észre a 25-ös és az F-15-nek 10-11 km-en volt ideje gyorsítani M1.4-re és felugrani 13-14 km-re akkor volt valamiféle esély a sikerre. Idézet az F-15-ös írásomból.

    Később nem csak a nyers erejét, de az erővel kombinált harcászati képességeit is demonstrálta az új szupervadász. Bomarc légvédelmi rakétákból átalakított távirányított, nem manőverező célpontokkal szimulálták MiG-25 felderítőgépek elfogását. Az első esetben éles harci rész nélküli AIM-7F-et indítottak 71 ezer láb magasságban (~21,5 km) M2,7 sebességgel haladó célpontra. A telemetria adatai szerint a rakéta a megsemmisítési távolságon belül haladt el a célpont mellett. A következő alkalommalmár éles rakétával végrehajtott lövészeten egy rakéta felhasználásával a Sas megsemmisítette az átalakított légvédelmi rakétát.
  • [NST]Cifu
    #80443
    1970-ben volt a HAP (High Altitude Project), amely arról szólt, hogy az új, nagy magasságban repülő MiG-25 gépek elfogásához egy átmeneti megoldást nyújtson, mivel a sima Sidewinder nem érte volna el F-4-esről indítva. A felső kép a China Lake múzeumában lett fotózva, 1970-ben végrehajtottak legalább egy tesztet ezzel a HAP rakétával, ez látható a múzeum falán, a rakétától jobbra lent. Az elképzelést kb. itt lőhették le, ugyanis többször nem merül fel, és érdekes módon egyetlen Sidewinder-összesítésben se szerepel.

    Az US NAVY a MiG-25 ellen inkább a Tomcat + Phoenix párost látta életképesnek.
  • molnibalage83
    #80442
    Ez alapján tényleg csak a seeker szekció különbözik.
  • [NST]Cifu
    #80441
    Az ESSM Block 1 félaktív rávezetésű, az ESSM Block 2 már aktív radar önirányítású, elvben 2020-ban fog hadrendbe állni.
    Számomra sem világos, hogy most ez mi a frászkarika is valójában. Az ESSM Block 2 "teljes" átmérőjű aktív fejjel rendelkezik, viszont az nemzetközi fejlesztés az ESSM partnerországok által.

    Tippre a Raytheon próbálta összemosni a kettőt, de nehezen megy úgy, hogy az ESSM Block 2 fejlesztését nem a Raytheon fizeti, hanem az ESSM program tagországok. Ezért csinált egy "olcsósított" verziót, amelynél egyszerűen fogták, és az AIM-120C orrát rárakták az ESSM hajtóművére, és persze az irányítást is ennek megfelelően módosították.
  • molnibalage83
    #80440
    Hoppá, erről sosem hallottam. Van eről bővebb anyag? Mert kicsit furcsa, hogy igen régi képanyag van, de az új kép meg mintha ennek a koncepciónak a feltámasztása lenne.
  • molnibalage83
    #80439
    Ja csókolom, pontosan ezt írom, hogy a 40/14 km-es HMZ az pontosan az ESSM paramétere és nem az AIM-120C-é...Az alap ESSM emlékeim szerint félaktív, de reklámanyagban aktív változatot is feltüntetnek. Akkor lényegében ez lenne az aktív radaros ESSM csak ilyen fura neve van?

    (Ez lényegében pont olyan, mitnt az SM-6, ami egy SM-3 asszem, csak rátettek egy aktív fejet.)
  • [NST]Cifu
    #80438
    Ha már Frankestein-rakétákról van szó:

    AIM-9L/M orr szekció Sparrow hajtóműre adaptálva:





  • [NST]Cifu
    #80437
    AMRAAM-ER videó (50%-al nagyobb hatótávról és 70%-al megnövelt max. repülési magasságról beszélnek)


    The AMRAAM-ER missile gets its boost in range from integration of the ESSM® missile rocket motor and smarter flight control algorithms.

    Vagyis az ESSM hajtómű-szekcióját kapja meg (Forrás)


    2007-es korai változat, "teljes" átmérőjű orr-szekcióval


    2015-ös makett, a rakéta kereső / irányító / és robbanófeje egyenesen az AMRAAM-ról jött, az van az ESSM hajtómű-szekciójára szerelve
  • Hpasp #80436
    Nem keverik, látszik hogy a 1332' -es célra (ami még a HMZ-n kívül van viszont felé tart) már indítottak a 2S MML-ből (rakéta jele az MML előtt merőleges vonal) vagyis az indítási távolságot nem jelzi ki a rendszer csak a HMZ-t. (több célnál amúgy nem is tudnád értelmesen kijelezni, csak a HMZ-t)
    Utoljára szerkesztette: Hpasp, 2017.02.01. 10:14:03
  • molnibalage83
    #80435
    Vagy a HMZ fogalmát összekeverik az indítási távolsággal M2.0 közeldő és nem manőverező cél esetén. Akkor valóban kijön az, hogy az AMRAAM eltalálná a célt. Apró hiba, hogy ez nem a HMZ értelmezése...
  • molnibalage83
    #80434
    Mi az az AMRAAM-ER?
    A 40 km-hez azonos léghiarc tömeg és kb. minimum 1,5x spec. imp.kéne úgy, hogy az AIM-7M és az AIM-120C között a fajlagos imp. kb. azonosnak látszik... Honnan a búbánatból jönne ekkora fejlődés és miért csak a NASAMS-nál van? Mert, ha lenne ez repcsire, akkor a Meteor szinte felesleges lenne közepes és nagy magasságban.

    A teszeken ráadásul nem 0 magasság és sebesség mellett indítottam, hanem 1000-3000 láb között 200 csomó táján, hogy a gép ne essen le.
  • Hpasp #80433
    Az tuti, hogy az AMRAAM valamelyik változatáról van szó, látszik az indítóknál a rakéta típusjele és mennyisége.

    1db FDC (Fire Distribution Center); A
    2db Sentinel Radar; A1, A2
    6db MML (Multi-Missile Launcher); 1S, 2S, 3S, 4S, 5S, 6S - 6db AMRAAM rakétával mindegyik; A6
    (kivéve 2S ahol 5db AMRAAM van; A5)
    fehér kör; 25km-ként
    zöld kör; 40km HMZ
    szaggatott vonal; rakéta/indító számára a cél kiválasztva
    folyamatos vonal; cél a HMZ-ben


    Utoljára szerkesztette: Hpasp, 2017.02.01. 10:08:44
  • [NST]Cifu
    #80432
    Kizárt, hogy AMRAAM-ER esetére vonatkozna a HMZ?
    Elvégre csak egy szimulátort, és nem éles rendszert láttunk...
    Utoljára szerkesztette: [NST]Cifu, 2017.02.01. 09:35:45
  • [NST]Cifu
    #80431
    Vannak itt érdekességek. Számomra picit meglepő (ám roppant érdekes és hasznos), hogy néha mennyi kvázi érzékeny infót lehet találni...
  • JanáJ
    #80430
    Izrael már Arrow 3-azik.
  • molnibalage83
    #80429
    Nagyobb loft esetén is az jön ki, hogy 18-20 km lerepülése után (tehát a ferde lőtáv ennél picit kisebb) a sebesség 1300 km/h a magasság kb 12 km. Ballisztikus pályához ez volt legközelebb talán.
  • VO101_Mate
    #80428
    Köszi, elèg jó debrief-ek )
    Mi a forràs?
  • ximix #80427
    A pdf-knek gondolom ez az eredeti elérése, csak ez fizetős ha jól tudom JPP http://arc.aiaa.org/loi/jpp Journal of Propulsion and Power. Esetleg ezen oldalon címre keresni majd a linkből, és az előnézetből kibogarászni a iktatási számot majd úgy keresni rá a .kz oldalon.
    Utoljára szerkesztette: ximix, 2017.01.31. 22:50:50
  • molnibalage83
    #80426
    Megnéztem BMS4-gyel az AIM-120B és C modelleket. Közelében nincs annak a HMZ-nek, amit Hpasp írt. AIM-120C-t tengerszinten indítva 0.2M táján 10 km feletti célra az jön ki, hogy a rakéta repül 18 km-t az indítási ponttól és felmászik 7000 méterre és ott már kb. szubszonikus.

    Ki van zárva, hogy AIM-120C-vel 40 km-es HMZ legyen, mese habbal. Repülőgépről nem indítottak ekkor távolsra közeledő és magasabban repülő célra.

    Megpróbálhatom nagyobb loft és egyéb célparaméterekkel, de ez akkor sem lesz 40 km soha a büdös életben 10 km feletti célmagassággal. ESSM-mel lenne ez talán reális.
    Utoljára szerkesztette: molnibalage83, 2017.01.31. 22:49:29
  • ximix #80425
    Itten van mentsétek, PDF hegyek :) http://enu.kz/repository/
    A mappa mellett az évszámra kattintasz, majd vársz míg betölt ezután kiválasztod amit nézni akarsz.
    Pl: Balázs "Solid Propulsion Enabling Technologies and Milestones for Navy Air-launched Tactical Missiles"
    PDF-jének jobb felső sarkéban van az iktatási száma úgymond,
    ami "AIAA 2011 6941", ez "2011/" évnél van.
    Nem tudom valami fajletöltővel le lehet e rántani az egészet és úgy nézegetni. Egy névjegyzék is jó volna.
    pl a 6940 es az a F-35B levegő elszipákolásáról szól,
    a 6942-es meg The U.S. Navy’s Contribution to Airbreathing Missile Propulsion Technology
    Ez egy Kazasztáni oldal, ha valaki megtalálja rajta ezt a könyvtárat akkor lehet név szerint is bogarászni, én még nem találtam rá, angol és oroszul ott van a "repository", de 502 bad getaway
    -------------------------------------------------------------
    -2014 Energetic Binders for Solid Rocket Propellants
    -Technologies for Future Precision Strike Missile Systems
    -1983 Non-Nuclear Air-to-Surface Ordnance for the Future
    Utoljára szerkesztette: ximix, 2017.01.31. 22:37:59
  • repvez
    #80424
    ha nem lenne jó a végeredmény, akkor talán holnap rá tudok nézni , ma már nincs időm rá.
  • Hpasp #80423
    Papírból fotózom, és OCR-el olvastatom be...
    ... elég fájdalmas, de már csak 2 to go.
  • molnibalage83
    #80422
    Ha bármely topiklakó ráérne és leforítaná a HT összefoglaló mellékletéhez, akkor megköszönném. Egyébként meg akkor angolul teszem mellé. :)

    Köszi Hpaps. Egyébként honnan vannak?
  • Hpasp #80421
    3 kép a lenti 3 történetről...




  • molnibalage83
    #80420
    A vicc az, hogy ez sem tudom, hogy honnan van meg, hétvégén találtam meg rendrakás közben. A neten teljes változatot 3 percig kerestem, de nem találtam...
  • Hpasp #80419
    1999, OAF eredményes pilóta debrief-ek (4/3)

    SPOILER! Kattints ide a szöveg elolvasásához!
    Captain Jeff “Claw” Hwang (USAF)
    493rd EFS “Grim Reapers,” F-15C
    Operation ALLIED FORCE
    2 x MiG-29s
    26 March 1999
    Call-sign: DIRK 21

    Capt Hwang Graduated UPT at Laughlin AFR in 1990. Upon completing F-15C training at Tyndall AFB, he spent six years flying the Eagle and T-37 prior to being assigned to the 493rd Fighter Squadron of the 48th Fighter Wing, RAF Lakenheath. "Claw" had been in the squadron for two years, and had flown one Operation ALLIED FORCE mission prior to this engagement. The following account is from an email he sent just days after the event to fellow Eagle Drivers.

    Well, I'm finally back in England after being Temporary Duty (TDY) since the end of January — at least for two weeks anyway. Got sent direct to Cervia AB, Italy, from Operation NORTHERN WATCH in Turkey after being at Incirlik AB for over seven weeks ("Luv the 'Lik" no 'mo!). My house and yard are a total mess!

    There doesn't seem to be an end in sight in the Kosovo situation, but the war is over for me, at least for a while. Some of you have probably already heard through the grapevine about what happened to "Boomer” and me. Here's the proverbial "Rest of the Story."

    “Boomer" and I were tasked as Bosnia-Herzegovina DCA on 26 March 1999, Vul time (Vulnerability Time, or “station Time”) from 1500Z to 1900Z. We were established on CAP over Tuzla for about an hour after the initial refueling. At 1602Z, while eastbound approaching the Bosnia/Yugoslavia border, I got a radar contact 37 nm to the east, 6K' (Altitude 6000’ feet), beaming south at over 600 knots.

    Of course AWACS had no clue, and did not have any inkling someone was flying on the other side of the border (although he was real good at calling out every single friendly WEST of us!)

    I called out the contact, and “Boomer” was locked same. Without an ID, and not being tactically sound to cross the border at the time, I elected to pump our formation in a right hand turn through south and called, "PUSH IT UP, BURNER, TAPES ON!" (We were initially flying .85 Mach at 28,000 feet, and rolled out heading west/southwest.) At that time I didn’t think anything much would happen. I figured the contact would probably continue south or turn east, and remain well on the eastern side of the border.

    Nevertheless, I called the flight lead of the south CAP over Sarajevo and gave him a craniums-up on the position of the contact, altitude, and the heading. This entire time AWACS still had no radar contact, even after I called it out on the radio. Man, running away with the contact at our six o’clock with AWACS not having any clue was NOT comfortable!

    “Boomer” and I continued west for a total of 60 seconds (about 10 nm) before I directed the formation to turn back hot, again turning through south in an attempt to get some cut-off. “Boomer” was on the north side of the formation (left side, as we rolled out heading east). We both got contact BRA 070 degrees for 37 nm, 23,000 feet, target now heading west (hot towards us). AWACS finally woke up and starting seeing the same thing. Now, I’m starting to think Sh!T IS GONNA HAPPEN (evident with the increase of about two octaves in my voice!).

    It was fairly obvious this guy originated from FRY (Former Republic of Yugoslavia), and there were no OCA missions on at the time. We still needed to get clearance from AWACS to engage, so I requested (codeword) and got no reply from the controller (pretty sure he had no freakin' clue what that codeword meant!). About this time both “Boomer” and I got good ID on the target in our own cockpits, and with threat hot towards us inside 30 nm I decided to blow off the AWACS/clearance to engage restriction and go for it!

    Target was now inside 30 nm, and I directed “Boomer" to target the single group. I broke lock, and went back to search in 40 nm scope and 120 degree sweep. The target then check-turned to the right towards the northwest (about 14L aspect) and descended to high teens. “Boomer” and I checked about 30 degrees left to the northeast for cutoff. This check-turn slung me aft in the formation so I stroke it up to full afterburner to get more line abreast. I called “COMBAT 1, ARM HOT,” and saw “Boomer’s” wing tanks come off with bright flames under the wing. Pretty impressive!

    I was well over the Mach when I punched my tanks off, and the jet jumped up abruptly (you can see it in the HUD). I took a quick look back to check and see if my stabs were still intact... I rolled my radar elevation coverage down, looking from about 5,000 to 21,000 feet, and no kidding, stayed in search for at least one full frame (believe me, I wanted to go back to single target track SO DAMN BAD!). AWACS started calling out two contacts, lead - trail. Sure enough, I was starting to see the break out on my scope!

    At about 20 nm “Boomer” called "FOX 3, 18K!” 1 saw the cons/smoke from his jet and thought “SONOFABITCH! I gotta get me some!”

    I commanded miniraster on the leader, and as soon as the radar locked, I immediately thumbed forward to HD TWS. My first shot came off inside 16 nm from the leader. When I pressed the pickle button, it seemed like an ETERNITY before the missile actually launched, but when it did...WOW!!!! I have never shot an AMRAAM or AIM-7 before at WSEP (and I don’t think I have a chance in hell of shooting more missiles at WSEP after this!). The missile came off with such a loud roar/whoosh, I not only heard it clearly in the cockpit above the wind noise, radio comm, ear plugs, and helmet, I actually FELT the rocket motor roar!

    In the HUD, you can see the flames shooting out from the tail end of the missile, and the smoke and cons following it! I stepped immediately to the trailer in HD TWS, and pressed and held the pickle button for at least three seconds. Again, thinking “COME ON, DAMN IT! LAUNCH!”

    The second missile came off just as impressively as the first after the same painful delay. I yelled, "Dirk 1, Fox six, lead trail!” (I was later critiqued on my comm as incorrect 3-1 terminology... WHATEVER!)

    Since “Boomer" was the primary shooter I assumed he was locked to the leader, so I kept the trailer as the PDT. Didn't want to screw with a good thing, so I stayed in HD TWS inside 10 nm (our Weapons Officer promptly criticized me for NOT going STT inside 10 nm upon reviewing my VSD tape; thus, I still have to pass my IPUG Tactical Intercept check ride!). Both targets started a left check-turn to the southwest (14L to H to 16R aspect) and continued to descend to low teens. Approaching 10 nm, checking RWR to make sure we weren’t targeted: "DIRK 1 naked !" “DIRK 2 naked !" "DIRK (flight), let's go pure!"

    From 30K, both of us rolled our jets inverted, pointed nose low directly at the TD box on the HUD, and pulled throttles to idle. I think my heart rate at this time was reaching my aerobic limit for my age (you know, that formula: 220 minus age...)! Against a broken cloud background, I saw a tiny dot in the TD box about seven to eight nm out. I called, “DIRK 1, tally ho, nose seven nm, low!"

    Realizing I saw the trailer, I was praying “Boomer" would soon follow up with a tally call on the leader. Approaching five nm, I'm scanning in front of the trailer for the leader, but no joy. Sh!t! The trailer continued his left turn to southwest, and I was looking at approx 14R aspect. Inside of five nm I thumb aft to AIM-9, and tried twice to un-cage, but the tone was not there.

    Just then, between the HUD and the canopy bow (about right 12:30 to 1 o'clock position), I saw the leader explode! The best visual description I can think of is if you held a torch from one of those Hawaiian Luau parties and swing it through the air. The flame, with an extended tail trailing the torch, is exactly what I saw! Turning my attention back to the trailer, the trailer exploded into a streaking flame seconds later just as I tried to un-cage the missile the third time! Never mind!

    "DIRK 1, SPASH TWO MlG-29s, B/E035!!!" I'm ashamed... I was screaming like a woman! I didn't really bother to keep an eye on the fireballs, so I didn't see any chutes. Later reports confirmed both pilots ejected safely.

    Anyway, I called for "Boomer" and me to reference 080 heading and short range radar. Thumbed aft to AUTOGUNS, plugged in full afterburner, and accelerated to 460 knots at 20K (20.000 feet). My cranium was on a swivel, and I was breathing like I just ran a full sprint!

    “DIRK 2, blind!” Crap!!!! I looked north, and it took me a few seconds to find "Boomer" (about 3.5 nm left and stacked high). I tried to talk his eyes back to me, but "Boomer" called out to west in a right turn. I waited a few seconds to sanitize and turned west as well. During the turn I immediately pulled into double beeper due to airspeed and Gs (looking back, I should've over-G’d so the mission would’ve been more impressive...).

    Rolling out. I was three nm in trail of "Boomer," so I had him shackled to the south to pick up line abreast. The fun wasn’t over yet, "Boomer" got an AUTOGUN snap lock less than 10 nm south of us, low altitude, with no ID. I told him to press for VID while I followed him three nm in trail. We were diving back down to the low teens, and I saw ABSOLUTELY NOTHING on my radar!

    "Boomer" all of a sudden pulls up and yells, "DIRK 2, unable ID!" That's BAD!!! I just about sh!t in my pants! I saw nothing, and after a few seconds I asked "Boomer" if he saw ANYTHING at all. "Boomer" said he didn’t see anything, so we just stroked it up and separated to the northwest for a while, then came back for a second look. Nobody home! "Boomer" thought it may have been a bad radar lock. I sure hope so!

    The rest of the sortie was one excitement after another. While on the boom, AWACS controller started calling out every single ground traffic as possible contacts crossing the border into Bosnia. For a while it sounded like a mass attack on Tuzla! By now it was night, and "Boomer" (in an offset 3-5 nm trail) and I were still running around with our hair on fire!

    One time AWACS called out contacts very low alt moving towards Tuzla westbound. I didn't see squat on my tube, and neither did "Boomer." As the position of group started getting closer to Tuzla, I expected to see a burst of explosion from the airfield underneath! "Boomer" and I were gonna go from "heroes to zeroes" real soon!

    AWACS later called out MiG CAPs just 15 nm northeast of the border! “Boomer” and I were ready to "Pop a cap in their ass" across the border as soon as we got contact and ID! Again, nothing on the radar. We even did two iterations of a grinder with a two ship of Vipers, and no one got a solid radar hit.

    That night we committed and armed hot THREE MORE TIMES after the MiG kills based on ridiculous AWACS calls! No kidding, by the time our replacement showed up (four hours of vul time later), I was totally exhausted and drained!

    The flight across the Adriatic was uneventful, and "Boomer" and I finally had a moment to think about what happened. After I landed and pulled into de-arm, I saw a freak in a flight suit wearing a reflective belt, jumping up and down. Sure enough, it was "Freak" welcoming us back!

    Taxi back to the chocks was like having a bunch of kids following an ice cream truck! Everyone came running out, and waited at the parking spot for "Boomer" and me. "Boomer" taxied in front of me as I pulled into my spot. Losing all professionalism and radio discipline (yada yada...), I called out on Ops freq: "'Boomer,' You're the Sh!T!!!" Getting out of the jet and greeting all the bros and maintainers was THE GREATEST MOMENT OF MY CAREER!!! Our Ops Group Commander was first to shake my hand, followed by the mob!

    We were laughing, shouting, hooting, high-fiving, and hugging! It was awesome! Couldn't wait to review the tapes, so we all piled into the "Turtle" (a deployable secure debrief facility, aka a small trailer) and watched my HUD tapes. Thank God it recorded everything clearly, including the fireball from the trailer.

    More of the squadron bros almost knocked me over when they came storming into the Turtle! We were all screaming and jumping so hard in the Turtle I thought it was going to fall over! Too bad "Boomer's" VSD tape did not run, and his HUD tape was washed out due to a high aperture setting. "Boomer" and I were laughing and high-fiving the entire car ride home! We weren't even supposed to fly that day!

    Some afterthoughts... No kidding, it took over a day for this to finally sink in. It felt almost surreal that day/night. Our Maintenance Officer said it best when he saw me hours after I shut down engines, "So ‘Claw,’ have you landed yet?" Only a few words can describe this event: F***ING unbelievably LUCKY! Not the fact we shot them down, but that they were airborne during our watch. Any Eagle driver could've easily done what "Boomer" and I did, but as one person said, "You guys won the lottery!"

    The sequence of events happened in our favor like the planets lining up. The jets, missiles, and radar (well, at least mine) performed marvelously! Our Maintenance dudes deserve the bulk of the credit. We had no spares that day. The crew chiefs and the Pro Super absolutely BUSTED THEIR ASSES working red balls and launched us on time! "Boomer," my wingman - what can I say? Regardless of whose missile hit which MiG, WE shot down two Fulcrums that afternoon. We succeed as a team, and fail as a team (good thing it was the former)!

    "Boomer" did an OUTSTANDING job of finding the group, working the ID matrix, and targeting according to plan. If I didn't have faith in him, I would not have broken lock and broken out the lead trail formation. Of course, I'm proud of what we did, but there's one thing I'll really stick out my chest for: to everyone who taught me and influenced me on my tactical flying and gave me long briefs (though painful at times), especially (names omitted), I DID NOT LET YOU GUYS DOWN!!! It doesn’t get much better than this, guys! Well, maybe two more kills would be pretty cool... That's all I have to say.

    Later analysis showed that even though "Boomer" shot first, it was "Claw's" two AIM-120s that destroyed both MiG-29s. Serb sources later stated that Major Peric and Captain 1st Class Radosavljevic were scrambled from Batajnica Air Base to intercept other NATO aircraft. After multiple malfunctions, to include both of the MiGs' radars, and some poor GCI directions, both MiGs were dispatched. While it appears that both pilots ejected, it is reported that Radosavljevic did not survive. Capt Hwang was awarded the 1999 Hughes Trophy for this double-kill.
  • [NST]Cifu
    #80418
    Korrekt anyag, noha örültem volna bővebb infóknak (alkalmazott anyagok, égéstér-profilok, stb.), de hát nyilván azok nem publikusak... :\
  • molnibalage83
    #80417
    Ameriaki rakéta hajtóművek.
  • [NST]Cifu
    #80416
    A Maulernél az irreális automatizálási és power supply gondokat leszámítva rendszeresíthető lett volna ez alapján...


    Olvasgatom még, amit belinkeltél, alapvetően a rakéta és a technológiai problémák ma már "hétköznapinak" tűnnek, az US ARMY egy kis méretű, mégis mindent tudó járművet akart, amely fél-automatizáltan működhet (azért a fire gombot csak meg kell nyomni valakinek). Ha nem élből akarnak mindent, hanem lépcsőzetesen haladnak (pl. manuális rávezetéssel kezdenek, aztán a következő változatnál kérik csak az automata tűzvezetést), akkor feltehetően sikert érnek el. De ugye 1963/-64/-65-ben McNamara volt a volánnál, ő meg közismert volt ilyen téren. Mivel drága lesz és egyhamar nem állhat hadrendbe, mennie kellett... És valahol érthető volt ez a gondolkodás, mert az 1960-as évek végén még mindig a II.Vh-s Duster volt az US ARMY első számú kis hatótávolságú légvédelmi rendszere...

    Vagy belátták azt, hogy talán mégsem lesz nuki háború feltétlen Kuba után?


    Szvsz inkább az történt, hogy rájöttek arra, hogy a jövő az olyan hagyományos fegyverekkel vívott konfliktusoké lesz, mint Vietnam vagy az 1967-es 1973-as Arab-Izraeli háború, meg Afganisztán.
    Utoljára szerkesztette: [NST]Cifu, 2017.01.31. 15:15:36
  • molnibalage83
    #80415
    A Maulernél az irreális automatizálási és power supply gondokat leszámítva rendszeresíthető lett volna ez alapján...
    Nem értettem soha, hogy az atomháborúra készülve mi a francok akartak a temérdek olyan légvédelmi eszközzel, amivel nem volt lelőhet egyetlen atomfegyverkkel támadó gép sem... A Mauler képes lett volna arra, hogy a sima gravinukival közeledő nem zavaró primitív gépeket halomra mészárolja. A Chaparral nem, még all aspect IR-rel sem... A Redey és Szrela-2 dettó ez.

    Vagy belátták azt, hogy talán mégsem lesz nuki háború feltétlen Kuba után?
  • [NST]Cifu
    #80414
    Pont, hogy fordítva áll a helyzet. A JSF esetén eleve az volt a Boeing problémája, hogy az F-15K-k leszállítása után leáll az F-15 gyártósor. Az F/A-18E/F/G gyártósor pedig addig fut, amíg az US NAVY azt életben tartja, pont ezért nyomulnak a kanadaiakra, hogy vegyék a Super Hornetet, de amíg még lehet. A Boeing most az US NAVY F/A-XX programjában bízik, ám arra évek óta csak csurran-cseppen, és még vélhetően évekig nem fog teljes erővel elindulni a program. Minden esetre az F/A-XX legalább reményt nyújt, hogy a Boeing egy új gép tervezését és kifejlesztését megkezdje.

    Hasonló volt a helyzet a hajtóműveknél, a P&W ugyebár megkapta a pénzt, hogy kifejlessze az F135-öt, de ha így marad, akkor a konkurens GE (és a vele összebútorozott Royce-Rolls) évtizedekig nem fog hasonlóan fejlett vadászgép-hajtóművet kifejleszteni (hiszen nincs mibe), így a következő nagy tenderre már csak a P&W marad, mint komoly hajtóműgyártó. Ez volt a JSF alt. engine elve, vagyis hogy anno ahogy az F-16-oshoz két különféle hajtómű közül választhat a vásárló, majd a JSF-nél is választhat a P&W F135 és a GE/RR F136 között. Aztán úgy döntöttek, hogy az alt. engine pénzkidobás, és nem adtak rá több pénzt - a GE és az RR pedig saját zsebből nem akarta a fejlesztést fizetni. Szóval a GE szempontjából még bízhat az F414 megrendelésekbe, oszt annyi...